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COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN DARFUR:  AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF 
PASTORAL NOMAD/SEDENTARY PEASANT INTERACTION 
 
LAWRENCE A. KUZNAR AND ROBERT SEDLMEYER 
 
Abstract: The genocide in Darfur, Sudan is the first major humanitarian 
crisis of the 21st century.  Over 2 million people have been displaced and 
tens of thousands have been killed.  Popular explanations of the conflict 
root it in racism and prejudice orchestrated by the Sudanese government 
and abetted by the world community’s negligence.  While the complicity of 
the Sudanese government is evident, a closer analysis of the sequence of 
events suggests that the crisis is rooted in local conflicts over material 
resources brought about by an ecological crisis.  Standard social theory 
has proven inadequate for analyzing the grass roots nature of the Darfur 
crisis.  We have developed a flexible agent-based computer simulation of 
pastoral nomad/sedentary peasant interaction (NOMAD) that can be 
adapted to particular environmental and social settings.  Our focus on 
how environmental and material factors condition individual agent 
response allows us to model how collective behaviors (mass raiding, 
genocide) can emerge from individual motives and needs.  Many factors 
influence the conflict in Darfur (ethnicity, global politics, Sudanese 
politics).  However, our simulations reinforce the analyses of some social 
scientists that argue the Darfur crisis is the inevitable result of the 
breakdown of land use in the face of growing populations, marginal 
habitats, and an unprecedented ecological crisis.   
 
Introduction 
 
The Darfur crisis is a poignant reminder of the violence that can erupt between pastoral 
nomads and sedentary agriculturalists.  We present a simulation, NOMAD – Darfur, 
designed to capture some of the essential elements of the conflict and provide insights 
into the nature of pastoral/peasant interactions.  The simulation’s parameters are derived 
from data gathered by social scientists and anthropologists who have worked in Sudan, 
providing a degree of fidelity to the Darfur context.  The simulation models some aspects 
of Darfur traditional subsistence in detail, especially regarding local ecology, livestock 
and crop production, family demography, and interpersonal conflict.  In order to keep the 
model within tractable limits, we have not incorporated supra-household phenomena such 
as lineage organization, the specific role of the Sudanese government, the impact of 
refugees, or international political pressure.  Our primary aim is to demonstrate how 
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individual family responses to ecological phenomena can produce conflict on a massive 
scale (Suliman 1996, 1997, 1998). While we acknowledge the selectivity of our analysis, 
we maintain that it nonetheless focuses on a vital piece of the elephant that is the Darfur 
crisis (Leaf 2004:291). Policy use of our model would require a more thorough 
specification of all influences on the current crisis.  Nonetheless, our preliminary results 
suggest some of the fundamental variables that need to be addressed to mitigate the 
current crisis and ameliorate its underlying causes.   
Tension between pastoral nomads and sedentary peasants is at least as ancient as 
written records; ancient Mesopotamians recorded such contention (Simon 1981), the 
ancient Greek Herodotus described Scythian nomad depredations (Herodotus 1972[4th C. 
B.C.]), and medieval scholars recorded contention and conquest between nomads and 
city folk (Ibn Khaldun 1967[1381]).  More recent scholars have recorded the history of 
troubled interactions in Africa, the Middle East, and China (Barfield 1989, Lattimore 
1951[1940], 1979). Anthropologists have recorded continued volatility between 
pastoralists and agriculturalists in the 20th century (Berntsen 1976, Goldschmidt 1979, 
Parkington 1984, Secoy 1992[1953]). However, raiding, homicide and rape are not 
necessarily foregone conclusions; anthropological observations are replete with examples 
of symbiotic trade between pastoral and agricultural populations (Barth 1969[1956], 
Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Simon 1981).  Facile generalizations are clearly 
not valid for characterizing the relationships between nomads and agriculturalists.  
The data may not be as hopelessly contradictory as they may at first seem.  It is 
possible that there are underlying, but competing, forces that tip pastoral/agricultural 
systems into different states of raiding and trading.  It is difficult to identify the 
underlying mechanisms of such processes ethnographically since ethnographic research 
is typically too short in time span to allow full appreciation of the long-term 
consequences of observed mechanisms.  Archaeological data provide a much longer 
time-depth, but suffer from archaeologists’ inability to observe actual mechanisms as 
they play out.  We use an agent-based modeling (ABM) approach to bridge the gap 
between observed mechanisms and long-term process relevant to trading and raiding 
between pastoral nomads and sedentary agricultural peasants.   
Agent-based Models (ABMs) provide a means for modeling conflicting forces in 
scenarios that capture more real-life complexity than possible through verbally stated 
theories or simplified mathematical models.  ABM simulations allow researchers to 
program theoretical processes, and test whether or not these processes lead to observed 
phenomena in the context of simulated social systems (Epstein and Axtell 1996).  
Anthropologists use ABM simulations to explain the rise and fall of civilizations (Axtell 
et al. 2002, Dean et al. 2000, Lazar and Reynolds 2002), to model the emergence of 
ethnic groups (McElreath, Boyd, and Richerson 2003) and cultural complexity (Read 
2002), to study irrigation systems (Lansing and Miller 2005), to model the impacts of 
tourism on arctic communities (Berman et al. 2004) and colonization on Amazonian 
ecosystems (Deadman et al. 2004), and to explain the creolization of languages 
(Satterfield 2001).  ABMs are also used to understand the emergence of social unrest, 
MATHEMATICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURAL THEORY: 
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
VOLUME 1 NO. 4                                PAGE 3 OF 22  PAGES                                OCTOBER 2005 
 
 
 
KUZNAR, SEDLMEYER: COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN DARFUR 
WWW.MATHEMATICALANTHROPOLOGY.ORG
   
  
   
 
 
rebellion and terrorism (Kuznar, Sedlmeyer, and Frederick 2005, Lustick 2002, 
MacKerrow 2003, Srbljinovic et al. 2003).  We have developed an ABM called NOMAD 
to model the essential dynamics of pastoral nomad/sedentary peasant interaction in a 
generic setting (Kuznar, Sedlmeyer, and Kreft in press). In this paper, we adapt NOMAD 
to the environmental and social conditions typical of Darfur in order to produce insights 
into the nature of conflict between pastoralists and peasants in this region.   
Pastoral Nomadism/Peasant Agriculture 
 
Pastoral nomadism does not exist as an independent economic system, but as an 
economic specialty linked to peasant agriculture (Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 
1980).  The history of relations between the people pursuing these alternative lifestyles is 
characterized by dynamic tensions and mutually beneficial interactions.  The earliest 
analysis of these interactions was provided by the Medieval scholar Ibn Khaldun 
(1967[1381]), in his analysis of urban/Bedouin interdependencies and conflict.  
Twentieth century anthropologists commonly note similar dynamics anywhere nomads 
and peasants coexist (Barth 1969[1956], 1973, Bates 1971, Berntsen 1976, Dyson-
Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Kuznar 1995).  The following relationships are typical:   
1. Pastoral nomadism as an economic specialization exists only in conjunction with 
sedentary agricultural societies, so that nomads must acquire the primarily grain 
crops they need for food as well as other goods necessary for their existence 
(Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980).   
2. Pastoralism is characteristically volatile, with much variance in livestock holdings 
from year to year due to environmental hazards (drought, disease, snow), and 
social risks (raiding, theft) (Barfield 1993, Goldschmidt 1979: 20, Kuznar 1991b, 
1995).   
3. Pastoral nomads mitigate risks by maximizing the size of their herds (Downs 
1972, Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Goldschmidt 1979: 23, Grandin 
1988, Kardulias 2000, Kuznar 1991a, b, 1995, 2001, Mace 1993, Mace and 
Houston 1989). 
4. Pastoralism requires constant vigilance to protect flocks from predators and 
thieves, and mobility to seek adequate forage for animals.  Mobility and 
familiarity with weapons creates a military pre-adaptation (Irons 1965, 1972, 
Salzman 1979:439).  Pastoral/peasant interaction varies from raiding to extortion 
to trading, based on the relative military and political strengths of nomads and 
villagers (Asad 1973, Berntsen 1976, Irons 1972, Swift 1979). 
5. The volatility of pastoralism and pastoralists’ dependency on their own 
capabilities reinforces a set of personality traits and behaviors, including:  
aggression, use of violence, and capacity to suffer physical hardship 
(Goldschmidt 1979: 24). 
 
Actual pastoral/peasant interactions can be quite varied based on contextual factors 
such as local government, environmental differences, migrations, etc. (Barfield 1993, 
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Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Goldschmidt 1979).  However, the patterns 
enumerated above are general and flexible enough to provide insights into specific 
instances of pastoral/peasant interaction (Barfield 1993: 4, Barth 1973, Gellner 1973, 
Goldschmidt 1979).  Their flexibility derives from the fact that they are relationships and 
processes whose parameters researchers can alter to fit particular circumstances.  The 
parameters that particularize these relationships include species of crops and livestock, 
variances in production, amount of mobility, availability of weapons, etc.  We review the 
relevance of these patterns to Darfur, and tailor their parameters to that region.   
Pastoral Nomadism And Peasant Agriculture in Darfur 
 
Darfur is the westernmost province in Sudan, the largest country in Africa.  The 
environment of Darfur is typically dry, and much of the region consists of flat scrub, 
steppe, and desert lands that typically receive 200-500 mm rain annually (Suliman 1996: 
Table 2).  The Jebel Marra massif occupies central Darfur, and this high altitude area 
receives more rainfall (500-700 mm) and has better soils for farming.  Two traditional 
economies exist in Darfur, cattle or camel pastoralism in the dry flatlands, and 
subsistence millet farming centered in the Jebel Marra (Suliman 1996).  Generally, 
peasant agriculturalists take on the Fur ethnicity, and are considered the original African 
inhabitants of this region.  Most pastoral nomad groups claim descent from Arab invaders 
from the 14th Century.  Although, so much intermarriage has occurred in ensuing 
centuries, and ethnic adoption and change is so variable, that any biological differences 
among the region’s populations have been blurred (Haaland 1969, Suliman 1996). In 
general, cattle herding nomads in Darfur and Western Sudan are referred to as Baggara, 
and consist of ethnic groups such as the Arab Rezeigat, Irayqat, Mahamid, and Beni 
Hussein tribes (Suliman 1996, Teitelbaum 1984). One camel nomad group, the Zaghawa, 
is considered non-Arab.  The relationships between pastoral nomadism and peasant 
agriculture in Darfur parallels the five patterns enumerated in the previous section.   
1. Haaland (1969: 59) makes clear that Fur peasants provide the millet that forms the 
staple grain in Darfur, and Baggara supply necessary milk and livestock; making 
the two populations interdependent.  Nonetheless, peasants often have small 
livestock holdings (Haaland 1969), and nomads plant seasonal fields to 
supplement their pastoral diets (Teitelbaum 1984:56). 
2. The climate of Darfur is extremely variable, leading to wild fluctuations in 
livestock numbers, and widespread displacement of pastoral nomads (Suliman 
1996: Table 1, Tobert 1985).   
3. It is clear from descriptions of pastoral nomadism in Darfur that pastoral nomads 
in this region are constantly striving to increase the size of their herds (Haaland 
1969, Suliman 1996, Tobert 1985). Other authors note this maximization behavior 
of Sudanese pastoralists in general (Ahmed 1973, Mustafa 2004, Teitelbaum 
1984). 
4. The history of pastoral/peasant relations in Darfur has always been tinged with 
tension.  In times of relative peace, there can be substantial cooperation and social 
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mobility between peasants and nomads.  Haaland (1969) describes how peasants 
who acquire cattle make contracts with nomads for the animals’ care, and how 
impoverished nomads sedentarize and wealthy peasants sometimes nomadize.  
When this occurs, the parties not only change lifestyle, but also ethnic affiliation. 
Even religious affiliation can be very flexible and contingent on economic 
lifestyle (Teitelbaum 1984:57). At other times, extremes of violence erupt 
between peasant and nomad groups, leading to raiding, homicide, displacement 
and slavery (Suliman 1996).   
5. Despite both Darfur peasants and nomads adhering to the same religion, Islam, 
Haaland (1969) describes a characteristic difference in bearing, attitude and 
religious practice between peasant and nomadic sectors.  Fur peasants gain access 
to land through patrilineally held lands, prefer sedentary village life, drink millet 
beer, and generally view nomadic life as barbaric (Haaland 1969:62,65).  In 
contrast, nomads maintain a haughty bearing, flaunt their martial tendencies, 
prefer the freedom their mobility affords and feel that milk is a preferred and 
necessary beverage (Haaland 1969:66, Suliman 1996). 
Environmental fluctuations influence production, herd maximization is pervasive, 
prosperity and poverty influence mobility, and people’s ethnicity changes subsequent to 
changes in economic behavior (Haaland 1969, Teitelbaum 1984).  These patterns indicate 
that any useful analysis of pastoral/peasant interaction in Darfur requires consideration of 
ecological and material factors.   
Darfur – Pastoralism, Drought, and Crisis 
 
Pastoral nomad/sedentary peasant interactions have always been tinged with tension 
in Darfur (Suliman 1996), just as with any other part of the world (Barth 1973, Berntsen 
1976, Khazanov 1994[1984], Kuznar 1995).  However, these tensions erupted into full-
scale war, leading many to call it genocide (Powell 2004).  Many media reports have 
referred to the crisis’ rooting in religious, ethnic, or racial prejudice.  However, analysts 
close to the conflict and with access to data on actual behavior have pointed out that these 
characterizations can be misleading (Suliman 1996, 1997, 1998).  There is a long history 
of intermarriage between indigenous African groups and Arab colonists (Suliman 
1998:6) and ethnic boundaries tend to be very fluid in times of peace (Haaland 1969).  
The factors that are most consistently related to conflict within the Darfur region are the 
occurrence of drought and the degradation of land productivity (Suliman 1996). Once 
these conflicts emerge, ethnic fault lines are solidified, and at that point ethnicity begins 
to have a more causal effect on perpetuating violence (Suliman 1997:2).   
From 1982-84, a severe drought afflicted Darfur.  This drought had an especially 
severe effect on the people because it was the worst in half a century, and it was 
accompanied by a shift from subsistence to market production in a context of increasing 
ecological degradation (Suliman 1996).  The low-lying plains where pastoral nomads live 
were hardest hit by the drought. Groups like the Zaghawa were particularly hard hit, 
causing many to fail as pastoralists and seek a living as peasants (Tobert 1985). Pastoral 
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nomads migrated into the Jebel Marra region of Darfur where rains are typically higher 
(Suliman 1996).  Some came to settle, and others for forage.  These trespasses intensified 
conflict between peasants and nomads (Teitelbaum 1984:59).  Given the irreversible 
effect of drought on declining environmental productivity, the conflicts continued.  
The majority of pastoral nomads claim Arab descent and affiliation, while the 
majority of peasants claim indigenous African affiliation.  Note that these claims belie 
historic intermarriage and ethnic fluidity.  Nonetheless, once droughts created a crisis 
over land, these economically originated social distinctions became the fault lines along 
which conflict emerged.  Nomads created an alliance against Zurga or “black” Africans, 
and horse-borne raiders called janjaweed would raid sedentary settlements and Zaghawa 
livestock.  Sedentary peasants created their own local political organizations, and allied 
with the Sudanese rebel group SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army).  These conflicts 
resulted in the deaths of at least 5000 Fur and the destruction of tens of thousands of 
homes (Suliman 1996).  Through 2003, the environmental and climatic conditions of 
Darfur had not improved, and the conflict intensified even further.  The Sudanese 
government, based in Khartoum, allied with the janjaweed militias and assisted raids by 
providing arms and aerial bombing.  The result has been the displacement of 
approximately 2 million people, half of Darfur’s population, and the deaths of scores of 
thousands (Powell 2004). 
In light of the Sudanese government’s involvement in Darfur, blame for the conflict 
has shifted to Sudanese politics, Islamic fundamentalism, and Arab ethic and racial 
prejudice (see Suliman 1996 for a critique). However, these explanations fail to take into 
account the origins of the conflict in local interactions between individual peasants and 
nomads.  It is understandable that, given a phenomenon as vast as the displacement and 
genocidal war against millions of people, that analysts would focus on the effects of high-
level phenomena such as governmental policies, or a pervasive force of racism.  There 
may even be the seduction that, if a lynch pin at a high governmental level could be 
pulled, the conflict would be resolved.  However, these hopes are either immeasurable 
(the force of racism) or fail to recognize the grass-roots nature of this conflict.  Agent-
based modeling provides precisely the analytical tool that allows understanding of such 
conflicts.   
Simulating Pastoralist/Agriculturalist Interaction in Darfur 
 
Agent-based models are computer programs that allow individual agents to interact 
with their environment and other agents according to programmed rules (Epstein and 
Axtell 1996). Researchers test theories of environmental influence or social interaction 
by programming these conditions and rules into the model, and then seeing if the model 
produces life-like results (Kohler 2000, Sallach 2003). These models provide for more 
realistic behavior than formal mathematical models because programming allows 
individual agents to behave in a more discrete fashion.  The problem with traditional 
formal models is that, often, individual behaviors are aggregated as rates and averages, 
obscuring unexpected non-linearities and path dependencies that often emerge in social 
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systems (O'Sullivan 2004). In ABM models, the same rates become probabilities that 
influence the discrete actions of agents, preserving the possibility for non-linear 
interactions to shift the model into varied and unexpected states as in real-life systems 
(Axelrod 1997, Terna 1998).  It is useful to note, however, that an ABM captures these 
discrete effects only to the extent that individual agent behaviors are disaggregated.  Our 
ABM makes use of the Java-based ABM programming framework called Swarm (Terna 
1998) that facilitates the programming of independent agents, the assignment of 
behavioral rules, and the graphical display of agent behavior. The various components of 
the model that must be specified include:  time, environment, productive resources, the 
human element, and behavioral rules.   
Time. Since agrarian and pastoral rhythms ubiquitously occur on a seasonal basis, 
an iteration of the simulation represents one season.  The seasonality of rainfall in Sudan 
is typically divided into rainy and dry seasons, but temperature fluctuations further sub-
divide the seasonality of climate.  Since each season differs in effect on environment, the 
simulation monitors four seasons with different effects on pasture and harvest.   
Geography The central region of the simulation contains high quality agricultural 
land, modeling the central location of the Jebel Marra. Pastures are scattered about the 
landscape. Each land type needs a productivity, hazard rate, and hazard effect in order to 
model environmental fluctuations that impact both agriculturalists and pastoralists.   
Agricultural Land.  Suliman (1996: Table 1) provides rainfall data for a 27 year 
period in Darfur.  Average rainfall is approximately 400 mm/year, and about 40% of 
years are below average and 18% below 1 standard deviation.  We use a conservative 
hazard rate of 12.5% for all lands in Darfur (representing a substantial drought greater 
than 1 standard deviation below normal rainfall).  This figure is consonant with drought 
figures for other African dry lands which vary from 10% (Dahl and Hjort 1976:116) to 
15%-30% as in the Malian Sahel (Diarra and Breman 1975). Mustafa (2004:41) provides 
figures for average sorghum and millet productivity in Sudan; combined, they yield about 
250 kg/ha.  Sixty percent of years have below average agricultural production, and 20% 
are below one standard deviation.  We use a conservative hazard effect rate of 50% loss 
felt during a fall harvest season, reflecting the decreased yield experienced during harvest 
time after a drought, consistent with figures provided by Dean et al. (2000:187) for 
decreased yields in arid lands. 
Pastures. An artifact of the Swarm framework is that agents can only inhabit one cell at a 
time. African cattle pastoralists typically graze their herds over large areas and multiple 
pastures (Fratkin 1991).  To model this effect, we assign an artificially high pasture 
productivity of 5000 kg/ha to a single cell (effectively acting as a number of cells across 
which a herder would graze his herd). Since pastures are growing at the beginning of the 
rainy season (spring), they typically do not achieve full productivity at this time.  
Consequently spring productivity is reduced by 20%, summer productivity is 100%, and 
fall (harvest) and winter productivity amounts to vegetation left over after grazing, 
following data from Sahelian Mali (Diarra and Breman 1975). Since the key periods of 
stress are spring and summer, we divide hazard rates evenly between these two seasons.  
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Hazard effects for pastures are often high ranging from 50% animal loss in Iran (Barth 
1961:7), to 80% dry matter loss for US western range desert-prairie (Cook and Sims 
1975), and more moderate 51%-57% dry matter (DM) loss (severe drought compared to 
moderate drought) in Mali (Diarra and Breman 1975).  Given the more severe effect of 
drought on pasture, we use 65% for the pasture hazard effect.   
Simulating a Major Drought Event. Once the ABM has stabilized to a dynamic 
equilibrium representing normal conditions for Darfur, we introduce a major and 
sustained drought event, like the drought that occurred in 1982/1984.  This is modeled by 
increasing the hazard rate to 100% for pastures.  
Herd Dynamics. The primary livestock in the Darfur region is cattle (Haaland 
1969, Suliman 1996, Tobert 1985). Cattle need about 2.5% of their body weight in dry 
matter forage daily (Iannelli 1984:93).  Herd mortality rates (mostly from disease and 
predation) amount to 8% in North Africa (Dahl and Hjort 1976:265). Since we are 
modeling a herd based on African cattle, the standard live bodyweight per animal is 
roughly 160 kg, and the standard meat take-off is 80 kg/per animal (Fratkin 1991:53),  
providing 118,400 Kcal and 17,600 g Protein per head. Fratkin (1991:53) and Dahl and 
Hjort (1976: 142) estimate an expected milk production of 1liter milk per cow per day 
during approximately 6 months lactation for 180 liters per year per cow, resulting in 
yearly milk production of:  126,000 Kcal/yr. and 6840 g Protein/yr per cow.  However, 
much of that milk goes to calves and is otherwise lost, and milk does not entirely 
substitute grain as a source of carbohydrates in East Africa; we appropriately adjust the 
amount of available milk as a fraction of the milk cattle normally produce.  The herd 
reproductive rate, only assessed during the spring season, should average about 1 calf per 
cow per year (Dahl and Hjort 1976:33-37).  
The Human Dimension:  We have instantiated an environment with resources 
and have characterized seasonal and random variations in those resources.  Now we must 
create human agents to populate and interact in this environment.  Some agent attributes 
are common to all agents, such as basic nutritional demands.  Others are specific to 
pastoral or agricultural ways of life, such as fertility rates, mortality rates, and life spans.  
Also, economic factors are specific to ways of life including labor demands, access to 
resources and raiding mortality rates.   
 Basic Nutrition.  We adopt the basic nutritional demand figures used by Kohler 
et al. (2000: 160) in their ABM of the rise and fall of Anasazi civilization in a dry land 
environment.  Nutritional demands are broken down to two basic requirements:  Kcal and 
protein.  Nutritional protein demands are 63 g/day for males, 50g/day for females and 
children.  Nutritional Kcal demands are 1872 Kcal/day for males, 1560 for females, and 
1000 for children.  Other biological and economic attributes are different for agricultural 
and pastoral populations.  
 Peasant Demography.  Sedentary, agricultural peasants tend to have higher 
fertility than mobile pastoralists (Roth 1986).  We use a Total Completed Fertility  (TCF) 
rate of 6 children/female as commonly observed for sedentary agriculturalists (Thomas 
1973: 147).  Comparisons of morbidity and mortality between peasant and pastoral 
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populations in Mali indicates that the peasant disease rate should be about 3%, and the 
childhood (age 1-5) mortality rate should be around 25% (Fratkin, Nathan, and Roth 
1999:157, rough composite estimate of 3% from diarrhoea/fever in Figure 7.3, 
Strassmann 2000:53).   
 Pastoral Demography.  Recorded TCF rates in pastoral societies in Africa range 
from 3.2 (Himba) to 4.7 (Pokot) (Fratkin and McCabe 1999:8). We use a pastoral TCF 
rate of 4.  Pastoral disease rates among Sahelian pastoral groups are closer to 2% 
(Fratkin, Nathan, and Roth 1999:157, estimated 2% from figure 7.3).  Pastoral childhood 
mortality rates are around 40%, as (Fratkin, Nathan, and Roth 1999:154, Gray et al. 
2003: S8, Roth 1986: 71). 
 Peasant Labor.  Each peasant household operates as a corporate entity that farms 
land to produce grain for consumption, tax payments, and trade.  A reasonable labor rate 
for arid land peasant farming would be 1 ha per adult and ½ ha per child, as suggested by 
figures presented by Hillman and Davies (1990:169). 
 Pastoral Labor.  Labor is a constant constraint on pastoral production (Dyson-
Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Kuznar 1991a, Swidler 1972).  Reliable labor rates for 
Darfur are difficult because very large herds that can tax a herder’s abilities are 
uncommon.  Considering Barth’s (1961) estimate of 300 small stock per herder, we think 
a limit of 100 cattle per herder would be reasonable.   
Raiding Mortality Rates. Raiding mortality has been directly observed among 
East African pastoral communities.  Gray et. al. (2003) provide detailed demographic 
data on raiding mortality among the Karimojong during different periods of raiding 
intensity and weapon use.  In the1950’s, an escalation of cattle raiding among 
Karimojong led to violence accounting for 22% of all male deaths (Gray et al. 2003:S15).  
It was 12% in the two previous decades.  Since 1970’s and the introduction of firearms, it 
has gone up to 33%.  Unfortunately, they provide no data on the number of raids a man 
does in a lifetime.  However, a man’s raiding lifespan is probably not more than 20 years 
and is probably intense while trying to acquire bridewealth (Gray et al. 2003:S18).  
Assuming one raid per year (probably more during 20’s, less after married), we divide 
the mortality rates by 20 to get probability of death on a raid.  During the peaceful period 
using spears, the annual probability of dying on a raid was therefore 0.006.  During the 
intense period of raiding using spears, the mortality rate would increase to 0.011.  
Finally, the introduction of automatic rifles has increased the mortality rate to 0.0165.  A 
reasonable long-term raiding death rate would be somewhere in between intense and 
peaceful with spears (0.0085).  These raiding data were derived from armed herders 
attacking other armed herders.  The rate for a herder raiding a relatively unarmed peasant 
would be lower. We assume that the mortality rate for pastoralists is half as much when 
attacking a peasant, and the peasant’s mortality rate from being attacked is twice as high 
(note that pastoralists can die in a raid, and therefore peasants are not totally helpless).  
Therefore, the per capita death rates per raid are adjusted to the following:  pastoral rate, 
0.00425, peasant rate, 0.017.  We maintained these low rates for NOMAD – Darfur to 
provide a conservative test of the role of weaponry.  One reviewer encouraged us to 
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conduct contrasting model runs with different access to weapons of different lethality.  
While the suggestion is welcome, it is beyond the scope of this paper’s preliminary 
model.   
The Rules of the Game 
 
We have instantiated an environment, resources, and agents with essential attributes.  
Now, these various entities must interact, and therefore we must provide them with rules 
that govern their interactions.  The rules can be divided into demographic rules, 
movement rules, and social rules (inheritance, trade, raiding).   
Demographic Rules.  For simplicity’s sake, we use straightforward demographic 
rules.  We already noted the childhood mortality rates.  Adulthood for agents begins at 
age 20.  All agents die at age 65, unless already dead.  If an adult agent dies, agent’s 
household disappears, since it is no longer viable.  Women have a 20-year reproductive 
lifespan (age 20 to 40), and their probability of conceiving in any year is their TCF 
rate/20.   
Pastoral Movement Rules.  Since pastoralists are the only agents who are 
mobile, only they are impacted by movement rules.  Each pastoral agent has a vision of 
10 grid squares, allowing the agent to know what is nearby his or her location.  Once 
80% of pasture production is consumed, the agent moves in the direction (determined by 
vision) of increased yield.  If there is no better direction, the agent moves randomly.  If 
an agent has a metabolic need (Kcal store is at 2 seasons minimum yearly resource level 
for family), the agent moves toward a peasant for trading or raiding. Under severe 
drought conditions however, nomads cannot simply move back to pastures since there are 
none.  In that case, the nomad remains on the nearest field to his trading partner/raiding 
victim.  However, we presume, as observed in the Darfur case, that peasants will not 
tolerate this intrusion, and that further violence will continue.  Therefore, while 
pastoralists cannot move, they will necessarily raid their peasant neighbors. 
 
Interaction:  Trade or Raid? 
 
 Trade Rule.  In order to determine whether two agents would trade, and at what 
rates of exchange, we use the trade rule developed for the Sugarscape agent-based model 
(Epstein and Axtell 1996).  Trade occurs when mutually beneficial to both parties.  If not, 
either the pastoralist attempts a raid, or if unsuccessful in the attempt, goes without.  This 
procedure models the risks agents incur in holding out for a better price, with the 
possibility of retribution.  Agents choose the nearest neighboring potential partner, and 
each estimates his own marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for the goods potentially 
traded.  In our model the two goods at issue are Kcal and Protein.  An agent’s MRS of 
Kcal for Protein is simply calculated as Kcal stored/Kcal needed for a family per year 
divided by Protein stored/Protein needed for the year (Epstein and Axtell 1996:103).  In 
our case, if a pastoralist’s MRS for Kcal is greater than a peasant’s MRS for Kcal, then a 
trade can occur.   
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MRS’s establish a range of feasible prices (quantities that can be exchanged).  If we 
have two agents, P (pastoral nomad) and A (agriculturalist peasant), the range of prices at 
which they trade is [MRSP, MRSA].  While these may be theoretically agreeable prices, 
they will not normally be considered “fair” since an agent wealthy in one good may 
“gouge” another who is needy for that good.  In order to limit the effect of such price 
gouging, we follow Epstein and Axtell (1996:104) and use the geometric mean of the 
endpoints of the feasible price range, or: 
 
Equation 1.  APAP MRSMRSMRSMRSp =),( . 
 
The amount exchanged is equal to p units of Kcal if p > 1 and 1/p units of Kcal if p < 
1 where MRSP: pastoralist's marginal rate of substitution; MRSA: agriculturalist's marginal 
rate of substitution.  Altering MRS’s by taking this geometric mean was important in the 
model because there emerged a great deal of price gouging that would probably not be 
tolerated in any culture, reinforcing Epstein and Axtell’s general intuition.   
One reviewer rightfully points out that different price schemes, such as traditionally 
set prices, might be modeled.  For instance, among Aymara Indians in Andean Peru, 
highland pastoral and lowland peasant families maintain traditional barter arrangements 
and front one another in times of hardship (Kuznar 1995).  Unfortunately, we do not have 
similar data for Darfur, and so cannot at this time incorporate normative pricing in our 
model.  We would like, however, to point out that in times of extreme stress, Andean 
trade relations break down, and in times of prosperity trade partners cheat on one another 
to strike more favorable terms of trade (Casaverde 1977).  Also, trade does not preclude 
theft and rustling when opportunities present themselves in the Andes (Kuznar 1995).  
Therefore, there exists a great deal of back-door negotiation, even when customary prices 
seem to be the norm.  The contentious history of land conflict in the Sudan indicates a 
similar weakness in the stability of trade norms (Ahmed 1992, Suliman 1998), leading us 
to favor a more individually negotiated form of pricing for now.  
In Epstein and Axtell’s simulation, if mutually beneficial terms of trade are not 
possible, agents seek other trading partners.  In our simulation, we more realistically 
model the harsh constraints of satisfying need in the short-term; sometimes, trading 
partners cannot be found.  Consequently, people either suffer resource depletion, starve, 
or use violence to obtain what they need.  Berntsen (1976) provides a description of just 
such raiding where Maasai choose to raid agriculturalists too poor to trade. 
Raid Rule.  If a nomad has a nutritional need, yet cannot trade, then the nomad 
may raid an agricultural household.  In most tribal societies, raids are considered 
unsuccessful if a member of the party is killed (Chagnon 1992).  If any raiders die, then 
the raid is unsuccessful and nothing is gained.  If the raid is successful, then the raiders 
divide the spoils equally.   
Model Runs and Results 
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Twenty model runs were performed to explore the range of resulting histories and to test 
the sensitivity of the model’s parameters (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1:  Screenshot of NOMAD - Darfur.  Red – Peasant households 
not interacting with nomads, Yellow – Peasant households raided by 
nomads, Purple – Nomad households raiding peasants.  Season is during 
harvest, when nomads and peasants are in close proximity. 
 
 
 
This particular screenshot portrays a spike in the raiding cycle. In earlier exercises we 
found that 20 or so runs were sufficient for covering the range of system responses in 
NOMAD (Kuznar, Sedlmeyer, and Kreft in press), and this number is consistent with 
other similar anthropological simulation exercises (Barreteau et al. 2004:268, Deadman 
et al. 2004:703, Huigen 2004:17, Kohler et al. 2000:164). Comparison to our earlier use 
of NOMAD to model Middle Eastern small stock pastoralism and wheat peasant 
agriculture is instructive (Kuznar, Sedlmeyer, and Kreft in press).  The NOMAD - 
Smallstock model typically stabilized to a combination of trading and raiding, with 
raiding being more common.  We also uncovered an intriguing necessity that peasants 
maintain small level protein sources and pastoralists maintain independent small level 
carbohydrate sources (mainly through milk production) (Kuznar, Sedlmeyer, and Kreft in 
press).  This is because, while each livelihood represents a specialization, if one is totally 
lacking in one necessary good, one’s trading partner can charge an infinite price for what 
one needs.  This potentially explains the importance of milk production for pastoral 
nomads, and the pervasiveness of small-stock owning among peasants (Martin 1980, 
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McCorkle 1990). Most runs resulted in an equilibrium seasonal harvest season raid/trade 
pattern.  NOMAD - Smallstock therefore modeled the characteristic tensions between 
nomads and peasants, but also the interdependency based on trade that many scholars 
have noted (Barfield 1993, Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980, Ibn Khaldun 
1967[1381]).  NOMAD - Darfur exhibits a more volatile picture.   
In NOMAD - Darfur, under normal environmental circumstances, there is a definite 
tendency for seasonal raiding (Figure 2).  We conducted sensitivity analysis by altering 
input parameters and tagging herder decisions to identify the underlying cause of this 
volatility. The increased volatility is the combined result of lower agricultural 
productivity in Darfur compared to the Middle East, and the greater wealth and volatility 
of wealth in a pastoral sector based on cattle herding.  In contrast, successful cattle herds 
represent greater quantities of wealth, although since each cow is so valuable, stochastic 
shocks (disease, drought losses, poor reproduction) have a greater effect on nomad 
wealth.  The net result is that peasants who trade with successful nomads suffer an 
imbalance in the terms of trade, and often do not have enough millet to trade with a 
nomad.  The result is that the nomad simply raids the relatively impoverished peasant as 
recorded among Maasai cattle herders in Kenya and Tanzania (Berntsen 1976).  In 
contrast, a nomad down on his luck is likely to have lost so much wealth with each of his 
lost cattle that he cannot trade with a comparatively wealthier peasant, and he will raid.  
However, under normal environmental circumstances, the next season likely will provide 
the nomad with an adequate pasture.  The nomad would then return to the pasturelands 
and the violence would cease.  In such a case, a seasonal pattern to hostility should 
emerge.  The NOMAD - Darfur ABM under normal conditions therefore models the 
characteristic tension between peasants and nomads that Suliman (1996) describes as 
normal for the region.   
Frequent seasonal raiding may be closer to historic reality for Darfur but it does not 
reflect the sustained genocidal warfare that threatens nearly all peasants in Darfur today.  
At this point, some analysts may interject that it requires state intervention on a massive 
scale to create such a genocidal war, as suggested by the U.S. State Department (Powell 
2004).  While the Sudanese national government is involved in the crisis, we think that it 
is premature to focus on government as a root cause. Analysts first need to consider 
whether or not local conditions are enough to produce a crisis of this magnitude.   
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Figure 2: Raiding/Trading Pattern from a Typical Run of NOMAD -Darfur 
 
 
The NOMAD - Darfur program typically stabilizes into seasonal raiding and some 
trade around iteration 20 (5 years) (Figure 2).  After iteration 40, we enact the severe 
drought scenario, and the model in about 1-2 years duration (4-8 iterations) goes from 
seasonal to sustained, continuous raiding (Figure 2). This time lag models accurately the 
1-2 year time lag Suliman (1996) records between major droughts and social unrest in 
Darfur historically.  The effect of the individual nomad agents’ not being able to return to 
pastures predictably results in their forced cohabitation and conflict with peasants.  In the 
NOMAD - Darfur model, this results in higher mortality among peasants, but also in a 
state of de facto slavery in which peasant productivity is appropriated, not purchased, 
from peasants.  The net effect is an eventual decrease in population despite the 
conservative mortality rates we used.   
The model depopulation of course mirrors the depopulation in Darfur today (Figure 3, 
next page).  This is curious given the historic persistence of slavery in Sudan.  In the real-
life situation, the martial superiority of nomads results in persistent victimization of 
peasant populations.  The key result is that sustained, genocidal warfare need not be 
organized and precipitated by national governments; it can easily emerge from the 
interactions of individual, unconnected individuals out of extreme environmental 
circumstances and competition over resources.   
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Figure 3: Population Growth and Decline in NOMAD - Darfur 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 
The NOMAD - Darfur ABM models several aspects of pastoral/peasant interaction in the 
Darfur region of western Sudan.  Our model omits other relevant factors (effects of 
marriage, movements between pastoral and peasant sectors, influence of national 
economies and governments).  However, its lack of supra-family control represents the 
lack of state control of violence that has been typical of the Darfur crisis.  The model’s 
emphasis on basic environmental features and small-scale family economics in a setting 
where the state actively neglects the peace provides insights into several important 
dimensions of economy, land use, and ethnicity in Darfur. First, the combination of 
environmental unpredictability, volatility in cattle herding, and low agricultural 
productivity in Darfur results in volatile model outputs.  These outputs indicate that, 
while trade does occur between the economic sectors, the potential for nomadic raiding is 
always high, although seasonal. Environmental fluctuations that improve range quality 
and seasonal increases in forage have historically alleviated some of the competition 
between nomads and peasants in the region.  
However, a series of sustained droughts and land degradation in the late 20th century 
created conditions that led to a phase shift from seasonal raiding to sustained warfare.  
The NOMAD - Darfur ABM clearly demonstrates, as analysts in the region have been 
arguing, that the root cause of the Darfur crisis is ecological and emerges out of the 
individual needs, interactions, and responses of peasants and nomads in Darfur.  We do 
not mean to indemnify the Sudanese government of responsibility for the crisis; they 
have aided and abetted the janjaweed militias, and their historic lack of effective state 
control in Darfur certainly created the political environment where local forces could 
willfully attempt to exterminate one another.  However, as long as political responses to 
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the crisis focus on the actions of national governments, the crisis will continue.  The 
predicted impotence of political responses is due to the fact that government policies did 
not create the Darfur crisis; therefore, change in those policies will not resolve it.  If 
Khartoum ceased all support for the janjaweed, the effect would merely be decreasing the 
efficiency with which the janjaweed conduct raids.  Even if one could disarm the 
janjaweed, the killing could continue on a massive level; the recent genocide in Rwanda 
was largely carried out with machetes, not AK-47’s and helicopter gunships.  
Unfortunately, evil leaders, multi-national cabals, or bad policy are not required for 
genocide; in this case policies don’t kill people, people kill people.   
We are not policy experts, but we think that the NOMAD - Darfur ABM suggests 
policy directions for consideration.  First, people are killing people, and this violence 
begets more violence in the form of retaliation.  Given the fundamental material cause of 
the violence, appeals to religion and brotherly love are unlikely to reduce violence.  
Likewise, regime change will likely be ineffective because any new government will face 
the same root causes and will find it difficult if not impossible to resolve the conflict no 
matter what form (theocratic, democratic, dictatorial) that government takes.  Clearly, 
outside peacekeeping forces willing to enforce a peace are required, as was done in the 
Balkan conflict during the 1990’s.  As of 2004, the African Union deployed 305 
peacekeepers, an anemic response at best.  Second, a genuine long-term plan for 
changing the economy of Darfur to sustainable agricultural and industrial pursuits is 
necessary.  Given the damage to the environment, a simple reversion to traditional 
economic practices is not feasible; traditional practices already failed and facilitated the 
crisis.  Clearly, a suite of alternative livelihoods that take advantage of local resources 
and that can be spread widely across the population of Darfur is necessary.  What that 
suite of livelihoods should be we do not know.  However, more extensive and realistic 
modeling and simulation of Darfur’s environment and population by area experts can 
provide an invaluable tool for exploring the possibilities.   
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